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Summary 
Lives and livelihoods in the Rural South are becoming increasingly divorced from farming 
and, therefore, from the land. Patterns and associations of wealth and poverty have become 
more diffuse and diverse as non-farm opportunities have expanded and heightened levels of 
mobility have led to the delocalisation of livelihoods. This, in turn, has had ramifications for the 
production and reproduction of poverty in the countryside, which is becoming progressively 
de-linked from agricultural resources. This requires a reconsideration of some old questions 
regarding how best to achieve pro-poor development in the Rural South.  
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1. FEET OF CLAY: OUTLINING THE ISSUES (SIMPLY) 
For most scholars and development practitioners, the poor world is largely a rural world and, 
in terms of livelihoods, this rural world is an agricultural one where farming predominates and 
where land is the critical resource. The assumption, sometimes explicitly stated but more 
often implicit, is that the solution to global poverty lies in the invigoration of farming and the 
redistribution of land. It is, in short, at the nexus between land and agricultural productivity 
that a resolution to rural poverty in the Global South – and therefore to global poverty – is to 
be found. For the UK‟s Department for International Development, “…land is a fundamental 
livelihood asset [and] secure, safe and affordable land is a necessary, but not always 
sufficient condition for reducing poverty (page 1)” (DFID, 2002a and see DFID, 2002b). 
Writing of rural Asia, Ali and Pernia state that „“typically, the incidence of rural poverty is 
inversely related to the size of landholdings, decreasing from landless to submarginal, 
marginal to small, then to large farmers” (Ali & Pernia, 2003: 3). 
In light of views such as these, it is no surprise that development interventions tend to 
focus on the redistribution of rural resources and/or on a (re-)invigoration of agricultural 
production. While the ideological inclination of those recommending fundamental land reform 
on the one hand, or the dissemination of new agricultural technologies (such as those of the 
Green Revolution) on the other may be different, they nonetheless identify the solution to rural 
poverty and underproduction lying in the countryside and, more particularly, in agricultural 
production. Not only do they see land/farming as a core ingredient in the essential recipe for 
rural development, but this is invariably framed in terms of small holder production. In these 
ways at least, they share the same ground and a common vision. 
This paper seeks to challenge this farming- and land-focused vision on the basis that 
it overlooks the direction and trajectory of change in the Rural South and, therefore, also 
overlooks the emerging spaces for development intervention. It is in assuming that we should 
look to farming and the distribution and availability of resources in the countryside to address 
rural poverty that, it is argued, the difficulties and inconsistencies arise. In making this case, 
which I recognise will be contentious at times and problematic in places, I wish to link different 
bodies of work on agrarian change, namely: work on the structural transformations driving 
deagrarianization; on the production and reproduction of poverty in the countryside; on 
livelihoods; and on cultures of modernity. To do this, the paper will draw on evidence from 
across the Rural South and will attempt to make a generalised case that has resonance and 
relevance at a global level. In places, however, it will be necessary to flesh out and 
substantiate the broader assertions with detailed evidence and case studies, requiring a 
degree of elaboration at the local level. This more detailed material will be drawn, to a large 
extent, from the Southeast Asian region.
i
  It is accepted that there are dangers in drawing 
associational links between „cherry picked‟ case studies and the general experience of rural 
development. Nonetheless the paper intentionally attempts to get beyond the particular to 
reflect on the broader canvas of change. 
 
(a) The role of land and farming: the Rural South and the Rural North 
Livelihoods in the Rural South do, in many places and for many households – perhaps even 
in most places and for most households – continue to depend on small holder agricultural 
production. The large majority of people in the Global South live in the countryside and the 
livelihoods of most, it would seem, are dependent on farming (Table 1). But, and even putting 
aside data deficiencies which would indicate that the figures in Table 1 overstate the role of 
farming and the size of the rural population and understate the level of out-migration from 
rural areas (see Deshingkar, 2005: 14-15), there is the important issue of whether the present 
state of affairs in the Rural South will have any historical resilience. In other words, do the 
present and the past offer a reasonable guide to the future? Writing of Africa – the world‟s 
most agrarian continent – Bryceson challenges “the unwarranted assumption that the African 
continent‟s destiny is necessarily rooted in peasant agriculture” (1997a: 3 [emphasis in 
original]).  
[Table 1 about here] 
Scholars and development agencies do acknowledge the growing role of non-farm 
activities (local and extra-local) in rural economies and livelihoods. But the abiding sense is 
that these activities are still regarded as add-ons to the main business of farming. In the case 
of rural-urban migration such is the level of official disquiet that it is not uncommon for policy-
makers and some scholars to propose controlling the process. The argument pursued in this 
paper is that not only are non-farm activities becoming central to rural livelihoods but also that 
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an increasing number of rural households have no commitment to farming whatsoever. It is 
not, therefore, just a question of weighting and balance, but of a more profound transition 
from one way of making a living, to another. 
As a way into the discussion that follows, it is worth briefly reflecting on the recent 
historical experiences of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea where rural landscapes have been 
profoundly transformed over the last 30 or 40 years. The agrarian transitions of those 
countries have been collapsed into just two decades. No longer is access to land a necessary 
condition for reducing poverty, and farming is just one activity among many in the countryside. 
Indeed, “once the major source of income and employment, the agricultural sectors of Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan gave up resources to the growing non-agricultural sector until, after 
remarkably short periods of time by international standards, protection and subsidisation 
became essential to their survival” (Francks et al., 1999: 215). While the pace of change in 
East Asia has been truly remarkable, the experience of the region does show how livelihoods 
and production in the countryside can be reworked in less than a generation, even while 
households retain their rural base. More recently, countries like Malaysia have experienced a 
similarly rapid and deep agrarian transformation.  
Given the rate of rural transformations in some countries, it becomes all the more 
surprising how wedded scholars and development practitioners are to the rural/land/farming 
paradigm summarised above. One of the key lessons of longitudinal village studies is how 
scholars characteristically misinterpret the trajectory of change in „their‟ communities.
ii
 When 
Michael Moerman returned to Ban Ping in Chiang Rai province in the Northern region of 
Thailand after an absence of just four years he found that farmers‟ actions had confounded 
his expectations: “It would be false to say that I had predicted this change, and dishonest not 
to confess that it surprised me” (1968: 185).
iii
 Eder, in his study (1999) of San Jose on 
Palawan in the Philippines gives an even more vivid impression of a scholar struggling to 
keep up with the pace of village change, leaving him with “the nagging feeling that I was 
somehow missing a vital larger picture” by using an original methodology that had “failed to 
capture change over time in the economic strategies of…households [and] other significant 
determinants of…household economic behaviour, particularly changing cultural values and 
ideologies” (Eder, 1999: xi).
iv
  
One of the most illuminating examples of longitudinal research – and learning – is 
provided by the work of Piers Blaikie and his colleagues in Nepal. In the mid-1970s Blaikie et 
al. (1980, 2002) believed that road-induced and market-led integration in west-central Nepal 
would “not deliver the benefits of increased agricultural production, increased 
commercialisation, and trade as forecast in the economic appraisal documents” (2002: 1256). 
The outcome, they reasoned, would be a deepening dependency and growing 
underdevelopment. The non-agricultural sources of employment and income that did exist at 
that time (such as employment in foreign armies) would not, in their view, postpone the 
„general crisis in the hills‟ for very much longer (Blaikie et al., 1980: 284). In a follow-up study 
in 1998 the same authors note that their pessimistic outlook did not materialise and admit that 
the essence of some of their original conclusions was wrong. Dependency may have 
deepened, but in a broadly positive manner, delivering higher incomes, more resilient 
livelihoods and higher standards of living (2002: 1268 and see Blaikie et al., 2001). The 
authors conclude: “The original model underestimated the capacity of the global labour 
market to provide work and remittances to sustain rural life and to stave off a more 
generalized crisis…” (2002: 1268–9). 
It may be that sheer familiarity with their subjects makes it difficult for scholars 
working at the village level to see the wood for the trees – I, certainly, have fallen into this trap 
– and to place their communities in the larger national and international contexts. The 
popularity of farmer-first approaches to both research and development may have also, 
unwittingly, contributed to forging generally narrow and often static interpretations of village 
conditions. Villager responses, based on bounded, indigenous knowledges, will tend to 
reinforce the status quo and legitimate existing conditions (see Mosse, 2001; Rigg, 1995). 
Researchers often take these at face value. Rhetorically, how can villagers who have culture 
in their blood, soil under their finger nails, and bodies stretched by their labor on the land 
possibly not know the direction they are headed far better than any academic cosseted in her 
or his university, not to mention government officials cocooned in capital cities and provincial 
centres? Even the international banks have been accused of narrowness of vision when it 
comes to the countryside. “The policy recommendations emanating from the World Bank and 
other international and national agencies over the past decade” Bryceson states, “have been 
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rooted in the stale assumption dating back to the colonial period that Africa is fundamentally 
an agrarian continent whose interface with the world market now and for the foreseeable 
future is in agricultural commodity exchange” (Bryceson, 1997a: 11). 
 
2. TRAJECTORIES OF CHANGE IN THE RURAL SOUTH 
In this section of the paper, the wider context will be outlined. Inevitably, in cavalierly 
squeezing the whole experience of change in the Rural South into a handful of paragraphs 
there will be gaps, oversights and grand generalisations. The purpose, however, is not to 
provide a balanced overview of the current situation in the Rural South but, instead, to identify 
and highlight those features of change that are seen to be likely to become more pronounced 
over time. In other words, what are the points of transformation and the broad direction of 
change? To summarise, the following processes and trends are occurring over a broad front: 
 
 Occupations and livelihoods in the countryside are diversifying 
 Occupational multiplicity is becoming more common and more pronounced 
 The balance of household income is shifting from farm to non-farm 
 Livelihoods and poverty are becoming de-linked from land (and from farming) 
 Lives are becoming more mobile and livelihoods correspondingly delocalised 
 Remittances are playing a growing role in rural household incomes 
 The average age of farmers is rising 
 Cultural and social changes are being implicated in livelihood modifications, and in 
new ways  
 
The village of East Laguna in the Philippines has been studied continuously since Hayami set 
out from the International Rice Research Institute in Los Baños in September 1974 to find a 
„typical rice village‟ (Hayami & Kikuchi, 2000).
v
 By the end of the 1990s, around a quarter of a 
century on from this initial foray, the region of east Laguna remained rural and the village was 
surrounded by rice fields.
vi
 While the village appears to be “as dormant [today]…as it was 
when we first visited it in the 1970s”, the reality is that East Laguna Village had become, by 
then, a very different place from the village selected some 30 years earlier. The closure of the 
land frontier, rapid population growth, new rice technologies, the infiltration of urban mores, 
public investment in infrastructure such as roads and schools, rising levels of landlessness, 
and the introduction of manufacturing activities in the village were just some of the changes to 
have buffeted the community and the wider region. East Laguna Village shows, in microcosm, 
the ways in which rural communities and agrarian economies across many parts of the 
Southeast Asian region are changing. In summary, over two decades the contribution of 
farming to household income declined from close to 90% to 36%, while the share of non-farm 
income rose from 13% to 64% (Figure 1). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
A similar picture of rural economic diversification and a progressive shift from farm to 
non-farm livelihoods is evident in the DORAS field survey of 45 sites in the Central Plains of 
Thailand undertaken in 1994-5, and in the same study‟s more detailed examination of three 
villages in 1998-2000. The team found that 57% of farm households surveyed had multiple 
occupations that included one outside agriculture, and that farming was rapidly becoming a 
subsidiary activity for many rural households in the region, the so-styled „rice basket‟ of 
Thailand (DORAS, 1996: 160; Molle et al., 2001). Coupled with these structural and 
occupational shifts were demographic transformations in the make up of farming families. In 
the six core provinces of the Central Plains region the number of landholders aged 35 years 
or under declined from 24% in 1963 to 17% in 1978 and by 1993 had reached just 12%.
vii
 The 
number of landholders aged over 55 years old, meanwhile, increased over the same period 
from 28% to 37% (Molle & Thippawal Srijantr, 1999: 25). 
While in Central Thailand occupational multiplicity may be highlighted as the 
emerging norm, Eder‟s study of San Jose noted above identifies a significant increase in 
households who have no engagement with farming whatsoever (Figure 2). While those 
engaged only in farming remained relatively unchanged between 1971 and 1988, pluriactive 
households spanning the farm/non-farm divide declined from 58% to 32%, while those 
disengaged from farming more than doubled from 20% to 45% (Eder, 1999). This shift has an 
important generational angle: „core‟ households (i.e. those that were present in 1971) show a 
preponderance of families with livelihoods based on farm activities or farm plus non-farm 
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activities; for „off-spring‟ households (those established since 1971), however, non-farm-
based livelihoods are the most important category (Figure 3).
viii
  
[Figures 2 and 3 about here] 
In India, the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) has been 
undertaking a continuing survey of rural households in 240 villages across 16 states since 
1968. This rich data source shows that between 1971 and 1999 the share of non-farm 
incomes in total rural incomes rose from 19% to 48% (Foster & Rosenzweig, 2004: 517-8). 
Another large scale study is the Deagrarianistion and Rural Employment (DARE) research 
programme undertaken in six African countries (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Malawi, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa) between 1996 and 1998. This provides the fullest and most up-
to-date picture of what is happening to livelihoods and activity in rural Africa (see Bryceson, 
2002). The headline figure is that the DARE programme found non-agricultural (non-farm) 
activities contributing a „remarkable‟ 60%-80% of rural household income (Bryceson, 2002: 
730), significantly higher than the usually quoted figure of around 40%.
ix
 The study also 
revealed a „youthful wave‟ (page 733) of workers in non-farm activities.  
This latter point – that there is a generational angle to deagrarianization where 
farming becomes, increasingly, a preserve of the old(er) – is most pronounced in East Asia. 
At the extreme, in Japan, by the early 1990s, one third of the agricultural labor force was 
already more than 65 years in age and the proportion in 2000 was over one half (Francks et 
al., 1999: 82 and Economist 2005: 74).
x
 In some more remote upland areas of Japan the farm 
household has simply been unable to reproduce itself and land lies abandoned.
xi
 The figures 
for South Korea are no less dramatic: by 1990, 55% of the labor force in agriculture was over 
50 years of age. Twenty years earlier, in 1970, it was just 20% (Francks et al., 1999: 157). 
„North Subang‟ in West Java, like East Laguna in the Philippines and the villages in 
the Central Plains of Thailand, “appears to the visitor as the prototype of [an] agrarian 
settlement” and is situated in the heart of the „rice basket‟ of the island (Breman & Wiradi, 
2002: 42).
xii
 Nonetheless, between 1990 and 1998 the share of the working population in 
North Subang engaged in agricultural pursuits fell from 75% to 58% (Figure 4). By 1998, two-
thirds of households had at least one member working fully or largely outside agriculture, up 
from one-third in 1990. Had krismon (the Indonesian economic crisis) not occurred this trend 
would have been yet more pronounced, but even so the authors suggest that “North Subang 
is becoming less and less a rural settlement dominated by agriculture” (Breman & Wiradi, 
2002: 101). Importantly, almost all the growth in non-farm employment between 1990 and 
1998 was extra-local; non-farm employment in the village itself had stagnated. But while 
extra-local employment may have blossomed, the livelihood implications cannot simply be 
„read-off‟ from this fact. Of the 82 villagers working outside the village (up from 40 in 1990) 
only nine were in well paid employment requiring a high level of skill. The remainder were 
divided between those who were self-employed (19, mostly petty traders in Jakarta), and 
those engaged in casual work (45, mostly earth movers). It would be tempting in this instance 
to assume that casual work of this kind is poverty-perpetuating because it does not deliver 
significantly higher incomes than farm work (on a daily basis). What it may do, however, is 
free villagers from the employment constraints of the agricultural seasons, allowing people to 
work through the year, so providing more regular work and income while also permitting 
scope for the creative combination of farming and non-farm activities. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
The final example comes from one of the world‟s poorest and most agrarian 
countries, the Lao People‟s Democratic Republic where, it is said, two-thirds of the rural 
population (which comprise 80% of the total) are subsistence cultivators (Lao PDR, 2003: 5). 
But even here, the effects of economic reform, marketisation and the integration of the 
country into the wider Greater Mekong Sub-region are rapidly transforming peasants in some 
areas into post-peasants. The evidence is patchy but, nonetheless, significant (see Rigg, 
2005b). In late 2000 the ILO undertook a survey of illegal migrant workers to Thailand from 13 
villages in seven districts in the three Lao border provinces of Khammouan, Savannakhet and 
Champassak (Inthasone Phetsiriseng, 2001). The survey covered 1,614 families. This is, so 
far, the most complete picture we have of levels of mobility and some of the underlying 
conditions and forces which are driving the process. On the basis of this survey, it would 
seem that the level of human mobility has escalated dramatically in the years since the mid- 
to late-1990s so that by 2000 between three and 13% of the populations of the study 
communities were working in Thailand (Figure 5). Lao illegal migrants, mainly young, are 
being channelled into low wage employment in textiles, construction, „entertainment‟, food 
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processing and domestic work, as well as into farm-based wage labor. In some of the study 
villages, migration to Thailand has become so pronounced that it has begun to influence the 
availability of labor for agriculture and a clear „gap‟ has emerged in the labor force of those 
aged 15–18 years old. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
How households and villages in circumstances of labor deficit respond would seem to 
depend on the level of remittances, labor costs in rural areas, and the willingness of other 
workers to fill the labor void. In Cavite in the Philippines labor gangs have been enticed in 
from neighbouring provinces to take advantage of the relatively high agricultural wages, 
themselves a product of the availability of non-farm work in the local export processing zone 
(Kelly, 1999). In Bangladesh it seems that heightened levels of rural-urban migration, 
associated labor shortages and the remittances that flow from the process have invigorated 
the land tenancy market, increased agricultural productivity by promoting mechanisation while 
also raising rural wages (Afsar, 2003: 14-15). In Peninsular Malaysia, and even with 
significant in-flows of laborers from Indonesia, Thailand and Bangladesh, large areas of 
agricultural land are simply left idle (Kato, 1994).  
Studies from Bangladesh (Afsar, 2003), China (de Brauw et al., 2001), and Asia more 
widely (Deshingkar, 2005) identify important structural changes in the composition and 
sources of rural household incomes. These include a declining share from agriculture, 
growing levels of mobility and associated remittance flows, a diversification of household and 
rural economies, and an increase in income for those „left behind‟. As one would expect, there 
are no neat, blanket generalisations that can be made about the effects of these changes in 
the Rural South except to note that they are having important – though variable – impacts on 
poverty, production and productivity, patterns of consumption, economic growth, investment, 
gender relations and inequality in the countryside. While the identification of general effects 
may be problematic, it is possible to identify some common forces propelling these wide scale 
changes in the composition and trajectory of economic activity and livelihoods in the Rural 
South. Individual cases will, necessarily, be individual but five propelling forces would seem to 
have some degree of common currency across the Rural South even if their relative 
importance varies between sites, countries and continents. These are: 
 
 The erosion of the profitability and returns to small holder agricultural production 
 The emergence of new opportunities in the non-farm sector, both local and non-local 
 Environmental degradation 
 Increasing land shortages 
 Cultural and social change 
 
In Table 2 these forces – which are termed „first level propelling forces‟ – are underpinned by 
a raft of „second-level propelling forces‟, not all of which will be found in individual countries or 
cases. The broad outcome though, will be similar – to squeeze farming and agriculture in a 
variety of ways. As ever, the devil is in the detail but it is nonetheless valuable to take a step 
back from the minutiae of individual cases in this way to see whether the larger picture has 
any coherence and any common features. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 (a) The role of culture and society: factors and positions 
Of the first level propelling factors identified above it is the last – cultural and social change – 
which has received the least attention, perhaps because it is the most nebulous and difficult 
to pin down. Maybe it is also because the analysis of agricultural and employment change 
has tended to be concentrated, in the social sciences, in economics and associated 
disciplines. Land shortages, environmental degradation, structural changes in the economy 
and in employment are generally well documented, even if some key implications (as 
suggested here) are overlooked. Cultural and social factors and, less obviously, social and 
cultural positions, are also deeply implicated in the economic changes outlined above and in 
people‟s views of these changes. 
To begin with the positions that people take, it is not unusual for government officials, 
development practitioners as well as researchers to express a strong moral preference 
(Bryceson, 1997a: 9) for village life and rural pursuits. There is a normative position that rural 
people should remain in the countryside and in farming. Villages are viewed as units of 
culture and social organisation and are seen to have a certain moral validity which can be 
traced back through history and which is firmly embedded in local cultural norms and social 
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practices and structures.
xiii
 It is when villages are fragmented by modernity, when village 
production is undermined by industrialisation, and when villagers are extracted from their 
natal homes that things are perceived to go wrong. Farrington et al. term this the „yeoman 
farmer fallacy‟ (Farrington et al., 2002: 15). 
This positioning of farming, villages and the countryside sometimes begins with an 
attempt to place farming at the centre of national identity. Falvey, on Thai agriculture, writes: 
“Agriculture has created Thailand and continues to shape Thai identity, support Thai lifestyles, 
and portray the Kingdom to the world” (2000: 17; see also Rigg & Ritchie, 2002). In Malaysia, 
the soul of the Malay, and therefore the soul of Malaysia, is still widely felt to be centred on a 
kampong (village) life and a rice-based livelihood. There often emerges a disjuncture between 
how some elites view farming and agriculture (often from afar), and how rural people view the 
occupation. In the east coast state of Kelantan the great bulk of the population are Malay and 
the primary economic activity is still small holder agriculture. Yet the “fabric of rural life in 
Kelantan has been transformed over the past two decades by the outmigration of young 
Kelantanese women to factory jobs in Penang” (Kusago & Barham, 2001: 1239). The 
association of Malay identity with farming continues, even while Malays themselves are 
migrating in ever-growing numbers out of farming and away from the kampong. 
That migration and mobility are playing a growing role in livelihoods in the Rural 
South is generally acknowledged and there is a rich literature on the topic. Surprisingly, 
though – partly, perhaps, for the reasons outlined above combined with the general 
underestimation of the scale of migration noted earlier in the paper – government agencies 
have continued to overlook this progressive disembedding of rural livelihoods from rural 
spaces. Writing of seasonal labour migration in rural Nepal, Gill concludes that it is “too 
important a topic for policy makers to continue to overlook” (2003: 28). For India, it has been 
stated that “official awareness of the magnitude of seasonal migration or the importance of it 
in the lives of the [rural] poor is abysmally low” (Deshingkar & Start, 2003: 1; see also Dang 
2003). In South Asia, as in Southeast Asia and many parts of Africa there is, it seems, a 
paradigmatic blind spot on the part of officials when it comes to understanding rural 
livelihoods in terms of non-local activities. In those instances where farming is not seen as 
central to national identity, there is often still the widespread belief that rural people are 
somehow „attached‟ to the land in a primordial sense and that if migration is occurring it 
should be controlled (Deshingkar 2005: 27-8). Hamilton and Fischer, writing of the Maya 
farmers of Guatemala state that “ethnographers have long noted Maya peoples‟ attachment 
to the land” and add that this is “a trait broadly shared among farming and peasant peoples 
the world over” (2003: 90). Such axioms are erected partly so that they can be challenged 
and the assumption of peasant attachment to the land is one such. 
From the perspective of villagers themselves, a rather different view often presents 
itself. Education, newspapers, radio and television, and consumerism more generally have 
profoundly altered the way that rural people think about work, farming and their – and more 
particularly, their children‟s – futures. Rural existences are becoming almost as monetised in 
countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia as are urban lives.
xiv
 Farming has become, 
often in little more than a decade, a low status occupation to be avoided. This view has a 
marked generational component: it is younger people who most urgently and fervently wish to 
build futures that avoid farming (Table 3). Not surprisingly, those who express some concern 
at the pace and direction of change tend to be the older generations. There is a 
methodological challenge in seeing this shift in generational terms, namely: how far does it 
reflect life cycle changes – implying that these young people will, in time, see the attractions 
of agriculture and return to farming – and how far is it part of a more profound and permanent 
process of cultural change which will feed through into later life? Both are, self-evidently, at 
work: there are behaviours, views and outlooks that can be associated with particular stages 
in the life course; there are also those that reflect the era in which people are living (see Monk 
& Katz, 1993). But, just as economic remittances fuelled by migration can transform income, 
investment and consumption patterns, so „social remittances‟ can transform production and 
consumption practices (see Goldring, 2004). There is a need, therefore, to tie economic and 
livelihood changes (with which this paper is primarily concerned) into wider social and cultural 
modifications. 
[Table 3 about here] 
3. POVERTY TRANSITIONS IN THE NEW RURAL SOUTH 
The paper now reaches its last substantive section in which I want to reflect on the production 
and reproduction of poverty in the Rural South in the light of the changes outlined above. The 
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question that underpins this next section is straight forward, at least in the asking: how have 
these evolving changes to livelihoods influenced the production and reproduction of poverty in 
the countryside? 
 
(a) ‘Old’ poverty and ‘new’ poverty 
For many in the mainstream of development work, poverty is an inheritance of the past.  
Individuals living simple and meagre lives are, almost necessarily, poor. The drive for market 
integration is founded on the assumption that it is because people are physically and mentally 
separated from the mainstream (i.e. from the market and from the state) that they are poor. In 
the case of Laos, the concentration of scarce resources on the construction of roads is 
founded on just such a belief and literature on the country is replete with references to the 
need to intensify market relations if poverty is to be reduced. The World Bank, for example, 
offers the view that “…remoteness is an important cause of rural poverty [in Laos]…” (World 
Bank, 1999: 7) while the UNDP argues that “lack of access causes poverty” in the country 
(UNDP, 1996: 3; see also Rigg 2005b). This conceptualisation of poverty is termed here „old 
poverty‟. 
There is also a thread of literature on Laos, and on other countries, that sees poverty 
as in large part created by the development process: “It is perhaps warranted to assume that 
in the majority of cases [in Laos], those groups who are living more of less traditional 
existences based on subsistence agriculture have ample nourishment and lead normal lives 
by their own standards. … It may likewise be assumed that those who are diagnosed as 
extremely poor or starving have been victims of man-made social or environmental upheaval, 
not infrequently in the name of rural development” (ILO, 2000: 9). It has been the engagement 
of people with the market and the Lao state that has made them poor (ADB, 2001). It is in this 
way that poverty in Laos (and elsewhere) is conceptualised as „new‟. 
It is all too easy to see „old‟ poverty being the standard view of the mainstream, 
including governments and multilateral agencies, and „new‟ poverty being embraced by 
radical scholars and many development workers linked to NGOs. More important than 
deciding which one of these views is „right‟ – and in a sense they both are – is to consider 
their implications for our understanding of the production and reproduction of poverty and in 
terms of the earlier discussion.  
 
(i) The production and reproduction of poverty I 
In a rural context where livelihoods are fundamentally founded on agriculture, poverty is a 
product of resource failures and inequalities, and central to this are the distribution and 
productivity of land. We can, in such a context, conceptualise poverty being reproduced over 
time through inequalities in access to resources (especially land) being passed from one 
generation to the next. Poverty, in this sense, is inherited as, of course, is wealth. The cry of 
„land to the tiller‟ and the impetus for land reform in many countries are propelled by a wish to 
break this cycle and the generalised failure to grasp the nettle of reform led many to predict, 
in the 1970s and 1980s, an impending agrarian crisis in a range of countries.
xv
 That these 
crises have not, in the main, materialised has been due to a range of factors, but two stand 
out. First, productivity increases in some areas of farming have been greater than anticipated 
and have permitted rural households to maintain their existing standards of living on declining 
areas of farmland and, at least, staved off a progressive process of immiseration in the 
countryside. Second and more important, however, has been the rapid diversification of rural 
livelihoods, a marked increase in mobility, and a proliferation in opportunities outside farming. 
It is this second tranche of changes that require a reconsideration of how poverty is produced 
and reproduced in the new Rural South. To illustrate this, consider the experience of Mrs 
Chandaeng. 
Mrs Chandaeng lives in Ban Sawai in Sang Thong district around 60 km from 
Vientiane, the capital of Laos. We interviewed her at the end of 2001. She was born and 
raised in Xieng Khouang province. Here she met and married her husband. They left the war-
shattered province to settle in her husband‟s natal village and lived there until he died in 1988 
when Mrs Chandaeng was 37 years old and her youngest daughter just two. A dispute with 
her husband‟s brother forced Mrs Chandaeng to move once again and she settled in Ban 
Sawai with her young family in 1991. Unable to secure any land beyond her house plot she 
struggled to raise her six children. Her ability to survive – and indeed, finally to prosper – as a 
landless, widowed mother of six was linked, ultimately, to the fact that four of her children 
managed to secure work in neighbouring Thailand. At the time we interviewed Mrs 
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Chandaeng, her children were remitting around US$25–50 a month. At that time her son was 
working as a laborer on a shrimp farm while her three daughters, Wan (19 years old), Lot 
(17), and Daeng (15) were employed as housekeepers in Bangkok. With these funds Mrs 
Chandaeng was financing the construction of a new house. She may have explained her 
children‟s sojourns in Thailand in terms of „when you are poor, you have to go‟, but the 
outcome was a degree of economic prosperity, at least in village terms. 
In Laos – one of Asia‟s most „rural‟ countries – Mrs Chandaeng may still be the 
exception to the rule, but this is not true everywhere in Laos (see Figure 5 and the discussion 
in connection with this figure), and even less so in most other countries in the region. The key 
point is that the production and therefore the reproduction of poverty are becoming de-linked 
from land and from agricultural resources more widely. It is becoming increasingly difficult, 
often impossible, to „read off‟ poverty on the basis of the usual markers. Sen addresses a 
similar set of processes and issues in Bangladesh where he writes that a „rice-centric‟ 
interpretation of rural development is “fast approaching its limit” (Sen, 2003: 516). In his study, 
the key factor distinguishing „ascending‟ from „descending‟ households is the degree to which 
the former have managed to display “strong non-agricultural orientations” (2003: 521). 
In Hayami and Kikuchi‟s (2000) study of East Laguna a similarly sharp de-linking of 
land from livelihoods, and therefore of land from poverty, is evident. Importantly, this has 
occurred in the context of significant agricultural progress. The 1950s saw the extension of 
irrigation to the village and the introduction of double cropping (an „epochal change‟ [page 
27]), permitting output to rise and keep pace with population growth even with the closure of 
the land frontier and growing land scarcity. This was followed, from the mid-1960s, by the 
rapid diffusion of the bio-chemical innovations linked to the new rice technology – high 
yielding seeds, and the application of increasing quantities of chemical fertilisers, pesticides 
and herbicides – leading, in the authors‟ terms, to a „bonanza‟ (page 33) for rice farmers. A 
further wave of agricultural innovations can be dated from the early 1980s when labor-saving 
technologies were introduced. Finally, from the beginning of the 1990s, with the stuttering 
recovery of the Philippine economy, so non-farm opportunities proliferated. This included both 
a dramatic expansion of in situ manufacturing (focused on village-based „cottage industries‟) 
as well as a burgeoning of opportunities beyond the village. Farming households rapidly 
became pluriactive units of production where agriculture was one activity among several. 
The significance of these changes for building an understanding of village livelihoods 
and patterns of poverty over time is clear in Figures 6 and 7. Figure 7 shows that over the 
period from 1975 land ownership in East Laguna became increasingly concentrated so that 
by the mid-1990s 20% of the population owned 99% of land.
xvi
 Over the same period, 
however, the distribution of incomes remained largely unchanged with the richest 20% 
maintaining their share at 56% (Figure 6). Clearly incomes remained skewed and village 
poverty, though it declined from close to 70% to around 56%, stubbornly high. But an agrarian 
crisis did not materialise and to appreciate why necessitates a view of rural livelihoods in East 
Laguna that not only shifts the focus from land and agriculture to non-farm activities, but also 
from the village as a spatial unit to the wider geographical context. 
[Figures 6 and 7 about here] 
So, to return to the key point of this section: how is poverty – and, by association, 
wealth – being produced and reproduced in the new Rural South exemplified by Mrs 
Chandaeng, the village of East Laguna, and elsewhere? Parents are intent on providing their 
children with the skills and education to engage with work outside farming and beyond the 
village (see Rigg & Sakunee Nattapoolwat, 2001). Rather than bestowing on their children the 
inherited benefits of land parents are willing, in more than a few cases, actually to mortgage 
their land to find the funds so that their children can escape from farming (see Hayami & 
Kikuchi, 2000: 69-70). 
How does this, in turn, link with the discussion at the outset over „old‟ and „new‟ 
poverty? Essentially the argument offered here is that the processes that underpin the 
production of „new‟ poverty (broadly, the incorporation of rural communities and households 
into the economic mainstream through market integration) offer the means by which 
individuals and households can escape from „old‟ poverty (that arises from dependence on 
traditional technologies, limited income, and remoteness/dislocation from the resources of the 
state and the market). The two are not competing conceptualisations of poverty but rather 
reflect the different ways in which poverty can be produced. Moreover it is likely that in 
individual villages both types of poverty will co-exist. In the context of Laos I have argued that 
there are households who are poor because of their separation from the market and the 
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facilities of the state (old poverty), and households who are poor because they have been 
drawn into the modernisation process on highly unfavourable terms: “In the new rural world 
beginning to emerge in Laos some of the land poor and landless have managed to escape 
poverty through creative engagement with non-farm activities” (Rigg, 2005b). Land has lost its 
strategic role for these households and instead it is other factors and capabilities which come 
into play: education, skills and networks, for example. 
 
(ii) The production and reproduction of poverty II 
The discussion above glides over a question which must lie at the heart of understanding pro-
poor (and anti-poor) growth in the countryside: How far do these new opportunities reinforce 
and accentuate old patterns of social differentiation? It may be, in other words, that rather 
than helping to rework patterns of poverty, these new opportunities, and particularly those that 
are the most remunerative, are inaccessible to the rural poor. It is also possible, of course, 
that these new activities may break the class envelope that formerly consigned the rural poor, 
and their descendants, to poverty (see below). 
There is little doubt that activities with the highest potential for income generation are 
also those with the highest barriers to entry and they, therefore, are concentrated among 
middle and rich rural households. At the same time, distress diversification by the rural poor 
often generates little surplus that can lift households out of their pre-ordained, inherited 
position in the village. In this line of thinking, rather than representing a „break‟ with the 
established patterns of poverty production, the diversification of rural livelihoods has merely 
served to widen the divide between the rural rich and the rural poor. 
In their study of North Subang in Java, Breman and Wiradi argue that access to land 
is closely linked to access to capital; and access to capital determines the types of non-farm 
activities that households can become involved in, and therefore the likely returns. Social 
mobility in such a context is limited (Breman & Wiradi, 2002: 51-3).
xvii
 While geographical 
mobility increased enormously over the last two decades of the 20
th
 century, in employment 
terms it has been quite sharply structured and has not led to a concomitant degree of social 
mobility. We have, in North Subang, diversifying and delocalising rural livelihoods but not 
ones, it would seem, that have restructured patterns of poverty and prosperity. This sort of 
development has not been pro-poor and may even have been anti-poor to the degree that it 
has widened the gulf between the poor and the non-poor.  
That said, even this apparently pessimistic vision of the scope for such structural 
changes to challenge social inequalities, offers some reason for optimism. To begin with, 
without the growing availability of low-paying non-farm work it is hard to imagine how poor 
rural households, landless or with sub-livelihood holdings, would have managed to maintain 
their rural presence at all. As Deshingkar writes with reference to migration from rural areas, 
“pessimistic migration analyses…fail to pose the converse question of what these households 
would have done in the absence of the opportunity to migrate” (2005: 2). This point is also 
pertinent to the diversification of rural livelihoods more generally. Even when livelihood 
diversification has been based on distress diversification it has delivered an income of sorts 
and while non-farm work may not provide wages much higher than farm work (but rarely 
lower), such employment has increased the amount of work available to a poor household as 
they creatively combine farm and non-farm. Second, there is evidence of a degree of porosity 
in the associations noted above. Poor households do, sometimes, access work which permits 
a degree of wealth accumulation. The trick, in policy terms, is to ensure that this process is 
encouraged and supported. As is explained in greater detail in the conclusion, the fact that 
richer households access the better paying non-farm employment opportunities is not a 
reason to control the process as a whole, but to provide the poor with the skills and 
opportunities to lever themselves into those niches where work offers better returns. The 
experience of countries like Malaysia demonstrates that this is possible. 
Those households being squeezed in agriculture, and experiencing what was 
described as „old poverty‟ above, are provided by such diversification with the opportunity to 
survive in the village, if increasingly not on the land and the possibility, it is suggested here, to 
build new lives with higher standards of living. This is rarely neat and often uneven over time. 
Begum and Sen writing of the „unsustainable‟ livelihoods of rickshaw pullers in Dhaka, from 
the very poorest segments of rural society, note that while this work may initially offer a route 
out of poverty and a means towards a modest degree of upward mobility, such is pullers‟ 
vulnerability to health shocks that it is not sustainable in the long-run (Begum and Sen, 2004). 
At the same time, remaining in farming may also lead to a stagnation or decline in livelihoods. 
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Writing of reform in China, Hy Van Luong and Unger argue that “for those families in China 
who remained largely in agriculture, however … [their] living standards began to stagnate and 
in a great many cases declined. … Those families who were stuck entirely in farming were 
very noticeably hurt” (Hy Van Luong & Unger, 1998: 67-68).  
All of this assumes, of course, that maintaining some sort of presence on the land 
(and in the village), when this is combined with various non-farm pursuits, is the best way 
forward. There is reason to argue, however, that this only consigns the rural poor to 
continuing penury. As the concluding section of this paper briefly outlines, it may be that 
policies should be aimed at oiling and assisting the process of transformation of farmers into 
non-farmers, and rural people into urbanites, rather than shoring up the livelihoods of small 
holders through agricultural subsidies, land reforms and piecemeal employment creation 
schemes. This, though, is only likely to operate in a developmentally positive fashion in 
circumstances where there is a vibrant industrial (non-farm) sector able to absorb rural 
workers. Without such a sector, people displaced from the countryside will simply undergo a 
geographical shift from rural to urban, while their standard of living will either remain the same 
or, possibly, decline still further. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS: OLD QUESTIONS, NEW ANSWERS 
The changes outlined above have, in places, fundamentally changed patterns and 
associations regarding wealth and poverty that we have become accustomed to, and 
comfortable with. No longer are the land rich necessarily also the prosperous in rural areas. 
No longer can we assume that small farmers are better off than landless laborers (see López 
& Valdés, 2000 on Latin Ameirca). No longer can we state, with surety, that tenants are in a 
better position than owner occupiers (see Molle & Thippawal Srijantr, 1999 on Thailand). No 
longer are agriculture and farming the desired, default position of rural households. No longer 
do parents desire a settled, farming life for their children. And no longer should we assume 
that agricultural development is best way to promote rural development, and rural 
development the best means of raising rural incomes and improving livelihoods (see 
Deshingkar, 2005). 
Assessing development in four villages, two in the north and two in the south of 
Vietnam, Kabeer and Tran Thi Van Anh conclude: “…it is clear that the ability of household 
members, whether male or female, to diversify out of farming is a key factor in determining 
the levels of household income and well-being” and therefore, they add later “to the 
achievement of economic growth, poverty reduction and social development in rural areas of 
Viet Nam” (2000: 30 & 35). The opening section of the paper noted the centrality of land and 
land policy in many visions of rural/agricultural development. Griffin et al. (2002) have recently 
made a renewed call for redistributive land reform as a means of tackling rural poverty 
arguing that such reform will raise yields and agricultural output, lead to higher total factor 
productivity, raise average incomes, narrow inequalities and, therefore, reduce poverty (see 
also Akram-Lodhi, 2005 and Byres, 2004). In contrast to the position adopted by Griffin et al. 
(2002), this paper argues that redistributive land reform does not, in the main, offer a solution 
to rural poverty, for two reasons. First, because the nature and direction of growth is 
progressively eroding the central role of land in rural livelihoods, as outlined above.
xviii
 And 
second, because for land redistribution to have any marked effect it would have to be 
sufficiently deep to give landless rural dwellers a plot of sufficient size to sustain livelihoods at 
an acceptable level – rather than just consigning them to rural poverty, but on the land. 
Furthermore, even deep land reform may satisfy rural needs for just a generation before the 
reproduction of the household and rural population growth causes the same issues of land 
shortages and livelihood deficiencies to resurface. The politics of agrarian reform can not, in 
the final analysis, stem the logic of economic and demographic change. This is a point that 
López and Valdés (2000: 205-6) make in their review of six Latin American countries (Chile, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay and Peru). Where such reform and resettlement 
has been undertaken, for example in Zimbabwe, incomes on farms have stagnated and, it 
seems, “many of the opportunities opened up by Zimbabwe‟s first experiment with 
resettlement appear to have been exhausted” (Kinsey, 2002). Even here, and dramatically so 
away from Zimbabwe‟s resettlement areas in the communal lands, livelihood diversification is 
meeting a widening livelihood gap. 
The best means of promoting pro-poor growth in the countryside may have less to do 
with supporting small-holder farming, whether through land redistribution or policies of 
agricultural development, and more to do with endowing poor people with the skills so that 
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they can escape from farming and, perhaps, escape from the countryside.
xix
 Investing in 
farming and agriculture may, indeed, preferentially support the non-poor and thereby widen 
inequalities in the countryside. This is an argument that Adams pursues in his study of Egypt 
where, he suggests, investing in agricultural activities will be inequality increasing because of 
the concentration of agricultural resources (in particular, land) among a small and wealthy 
sub-set of the rural population (Adams, 2002). One can imagine a similar trajectory and 
outcome in East Laguna where agricultural investments and initiatives will benefit the minority 
of the population who have access to land (see Figure 7). 
Where agrarian reform does lead to a redistribution of land, it may not lead to a 
concomitant redistribution of wealth. Land owners may find it attractive to give up their land, 
particularly when it is transferred at market value (as with market-led agrarian reform, see 
Borras 2005) and in a context where farming is losing its attractiveness, where alternative 
occupations are multiplying, and where non-farm investments yield a higher return than farm 
investments. In East Cirebon land sales were not always an indication of desperation but of 
relatively wealthy households freeing up capital to invest in other activities (in this instance, in 
brickworks) (Breman & Wiradi, 2002: 232). 
There is, though, another way of looking at the issue, which is to re-focus the 
question on rural spaces, rather than on rural populations. What is the best means of 
supporting the emergence of productive and sustainable rural spaces and rural economies? 
This requires governments to think of farmers not as peasants, but as agrarian entrepreneurs. 
The challenge is to ensure that those (relatively) few households who remain on the land can 
make the transition from being peasant farmers who produce largely to meet subsistence 
needs, to becoming commercially aware producers geared to the demands of the market. 
This, of course, assumes out of the equation a large proportion of the current rural population 
who could never become rural entrepreneurs because they lack the (land) resources to do so; 
their interests are best served by seeing rural futures as differentiated and complex with 
multiple avenues towards achieving sustainable livelihoods that are increasingly likely to be 
divorced, spatially and occupationally, from the land. 
Table 4 sets out three questions that lie at the heart of rural development policy in the 
Rural South: 
 
 Who are the rural rich and who are the rural poor? 
 What is the most effective way to assist and support the livelihoods of the rural poor? 
 How do we build sustainable futures in the Rural South? 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
The table also provides the „old‟ or „established‟ answers to these questions and, as a way of 
conclusion, a set of „new‟ or „revisionist‟ answers. These are framed in such a way so as to 
make clear the essence of the paper‟s argument. It is accepted that in reality a partial and 
geographically fragmented process of change is underway where clear transitions from one 
set of „answers‟ to another are unlikely. As the paper has tried to make clear, the reason why 
these questions in certain contexts and circumstances are raising different answers is 
because a number of associations or links have become frayed and, in some cases, broken. 
Livelihoods have become de-linked from farming; poverty and inequality from land ownership; 
and poverty and inequality from occupation and activity. In Europe it may have taken half a 
century to grasp the nettle of rural development and see farming as just one of many activities 
in rural spaces. In the Rural South the luxury of such a desultory approach may not be 
possible. 
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Table 1 
A Rural and Agricultural Global South? 
 % population living in 
countryside (2002) 
% working population in 
agriculture 
1990 1999 
Developing countries 59 58  
Least developed counties 74 -  
    
East Asia & the Pacific 60 69  
Latin America & the 
Caribbean 
24 26  
South Asia 70 64  
Sub-Saharan Africa 65 68  
    
High income 22 5  
Middle income 47 31  
Low income 69 69  
    
Southeast Asia    
Cambodia 88 - 74 
Indonesia 55 55 45 
Laos 80 78 78 
Malaysia 37 27 19 
Myanmar 71 73 63 
Philippines 40 46 40 
Thailand 68 64 51 
Vietnam 75 71 71 
 
Sources: UNDP (http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/hdr04_HDI.pdf); World Bank 
1996; World development indicators, www.worldbank.org; UNDP statistics, www.undp.org.  
Table 2 
First and second level propelling forces in rural transformations 
First level 
propelling 
forces 
Selected second level propelling 
forces/factors 
Examples 
1. Erosion of 
profitability of 
small-holder 
farming 
 National policies favouring 
industry (urban/industrial bias) 
 „Surplus transfer‟ from 
agriculture through taxation  
 Structural adjustment and neo-
liberalism 
 Declining terms of trade 
between farm and non-farm 
 
 National policies and declining 
competitiveness of African 
small-holder agriculture 
(Bryceson 1997b: 239-242) 
 Extraction of surplus from the 
agricultural sector through 
taxation in Taiwan and Japan 
(Francks et al 1999, Bello et al. 
1998) 
 Consistent policy of bias against 
agriculture in China (Carter 
2000: 21) 
 Very slim profit margins for rice 
farmers in the Philippines (Kelly 
2000: 88) 
 Low farm wages and the 
disempowerment of peasants in 
Thailand (Glassman 2004: 105) 
 The Burmese state‟s 
progressive taxation of farmers 
through the forced sale of 
quotas at below market prices 
(Chaw Chaw 2003: 208-9) 
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2. Emergence 
of new, non-
farm 
opportunities  
 Foreign investment 
 National policies of export-led 
development focused on 
manufacturing 
 Improving access and 
heightened levels of mobility 
associated with infrastructural 
improvements 
 Education 
 Massive expansion of Township 
& Village Enterprises (TVEs) in 
China (Kirkby & Zhao Xiaobin 
1999, Parish et al. 1995, Smyth 
1998, Weixing Chen 1998, 
Wang 1997) 
 Philippines (Kelly 2000) 
 Infrastructure-driven market 
integration in Laos (Rigg 2005b) 
3. 
Environmental 
degradation 
 Environmental conflicts 
between farm and non-farm 
activities in rural areas 
 Labor shortages hampering 
essential maintenance of farm 
infrastructure 
 Over-cropping, over-grazing 
and other non-sustainable 
cultivation practices 
 Deforestation and associated 
environmental degradation 
 Semi-arid regions of Africa 
(Bryceson 1997b: 237-239) 
 Irrigation systems falling into 
disrepair in the Philippines (Kelly 
2000) and Japan (Francks et al. 
1999: 82) due to labor 
shortages. 
 Land degradation in Bangladesh 
(Ali 2004) 
4. Increasing 
land 
shortages 
 Population growth 
 Sequestration of land by the 
state and agencies linked to 
the state 
 Closing of the land frontier 
 Concentration of land 
resources in a small class of 
landed households 
 Effects of land reform 
 Land reform and effects on land 
availability in the Philippines 
(Hayami and Kikuchi 2000) 
5. Social and 
cultural 
changes 
 Mobility 
 Media-led consumerism 
 Education 
 Ageing of farmers (Francks et 
al. 1999: 82 and 157 on Japan 
and South Korea; Rigg and 
Sakunee Nattapoolwat 2001 on 
Thailand) 
 Than samai cultures of 
modernity among young women 
in Thailand (Mills 1997, 1999) 
and cultural change among 
young people in the Philippines 
(Kelly 2000: 102-3) 
 Higher levels of mobility driven 
by changing cultural values in 
Laos (Inthasone Phetsiriseng 
2001) 
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Table 3 
Changing rural desires: Asian views 
Site Date of 
survey 
Comment Source 
Desa Buyut, Cirebon, 
north Java 
September 
2001 
“…the youth of the village…express 
little interest in working in the farming 
sector…” (page 261) 
SMERU 2004 
Barrio Bunga, Cavite, 
Philippines 
1995 “..young people have shifted their 
aspirations and expectations away 
from a rural life and towards other 
forms of work.” 
Kelly 2000: 
103 
Ban Naa Sakae, 
Northeastern 
Thailand 
1987-1993 “In my youth we wanted to go work in 
the fields, to help our parents. All our 
friends did the same. Now children go 
to school for so many years and they 
don‟t want to do farm work” (Phôyaay 
Daeng, aged 64 [1990]). 
Mills 1999: 81 
Temon sub-district, 
Yogyakarta, 
Indonesia 
2000 “Most return migrants stated that they 
do not want to work in the agricultural 
sector even if they still have 
agricultural land or have the ability to 
buy new land” 
Supang 
Chantavanich 
et al. 2001: 
124 
Rangoon (Yangon) 
periphery, Burma 
(Myanmar) 
2000 “In terms of personal motivation, 
women migrate to the city to 
experience new things and to expand 
their knowledge, to flee from tiresome 
agricultural work, to gain a good 
reputation from working in the city, to 
escape the control of parents and 
elders, and to attain personal 
freedom. Therefore…the decision to 
seek factory work is not 
straightforwardly economic. … Most 
of them do not wish to return 
home…unless they become wealth. 
… None of them want to return homw 
for the time being because they do 
not want to work on the farm.” 
Chaw Chaw 
2003: 216 and 
219-220) 
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Table 4 
Rural poverty and rural production: questions, answers and associations 
Questions/issues ‘Old’ or 
‘established’ 
answers 
‘New’ or 
‘revisionist’ 
answers 
Broken 
links/associations 
Who are the rural 
rich? 
The land rich Both the land rich 
and the land poor 
Livelihoods have 
become 
progressively de-
linked from farming 
and therefore from 
land 
What is the best way 
to assist the rural 
poor? 
To redistribute land 
To invest in 
agriculture 
To re-skill the poor 
(Investing in 
agriculture is 
inequality widening) 
Poverty and 
inequality have 
become de-linked 
from activity and 
occupation  
How do we build 
sustainable futures in 
the Rural South? 
Through supporting 
small-holder farming 
Through supporting 
people‟s efforts to 
leave farming 
By permitting the 
amalgamation of land 
holding and the 
emergence of large 
land owners and 
agrarian 
entrepreneurs 
The association of 
pro-poor policies with 
small holder farming 
has been broken 
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Figure 1 
Source of income, farm and non-farm, East Laguna Village, Philippines 
 
Source: based on data in Hayami and Kikuchi, 2000: 235 
 
Source data 
 
 Farm 
Non-
farm 
1974/76 87 13 
1980/83 62 38 
1995/96 36 64 
 24 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1971 1988
Survey Dates
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
Both agriculture and
non-agriculture
Non-agriculture only
Agriculture only
 
 
Figure 2 
Sources of household income, San Jose, Philippines (1971 and 1988) 
 
Source: based on data in Eder, 1999: 75 
 
Source data 
 
 1971 1988 
Agriculture only 22.3 23 
Non-agriculture only 19.6 44.6 
Both agriculture and non-
agriculture 58 32.4 
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Figure 3 
Income sources for core and off-spring households, San Jose, Philippines (1988) 
 
Source: based on data in Eder, 1999: 78-9 
 
Source data 
 
 Core 
Households 
Off-spring 
Households 
Agriculture only 25 25 
Non-agriculture only 8 40 
Both agriculture and non-agriculture 30 31 
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Figure 4 
Distribution of the working population within and outside agriculture in North Subang, 
1990 and 1998 
 
Source: data extracted from Breman and Wiradi, 2002: 101 
 1990 1998 
Peasant cultivators 82 73 
Other agrarian 
producers 5 9 
Farm labourers 249 229 
Trade 39 80 
Transport 16 29 
Services 26 69 
Government 11 11 
Other (permanent)  8 
Other (casual) 20 30 
 448 538 
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Figure 5 
Mobility in 13 villages, seven districts and three provinces: illegal labor migration to 
Thailand (2000) 
 
Note: the total population of the villages in this survey was 15,594 and the total number of 
migrants, 992. 
 
Source: data extracted from Inthasone Phetsiriseng, 2001 
 
 
Male 
migrants Female migrants 
Nongbok, Khammouan 5.50 7.01 12.51 
Sebangfai, Khammouan 2.29 1.08 3.38 
Kanthabouri, Savannakhet 2.10 3.59 5.69 
Outhoumphone, 
Savannakhet 2.51 4.13 6.64 
Songkhone, Savannakhet 1.94 3.37 5.31 
Pakse, Champassak 1.56 3.29 4.86 
Phonethong, Champassak 4.13 5.43 9.56 
Pathumphone, 
Champassak 2.07 0.87 2.93 
Total 2.76 3.60 6.36 
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Figure 6 
Share of income of top and bottom quintiles, East Laguna, Philippines (1974-1995) 
 
Source: data extracted from Hayami and Kikuchi, 2000: 240 
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Figure 7 
Share of land of top quintile, East Laguna, Philippines (1966-1995) 
 
Note: land share of bottom quintile throughout the period is zero 
Source: data extracted from Hayami and Kikuchi, 2000: 240 
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Notes 
 
i
 A paper I wrote nearly 20 years ago (Rigg, 1986) raised some of the issues I explore here, and I have 
returned to the theme on a number of occasions since (Rigg 1998a, 1998b, 2005a, Rigg and Sakunee 
Nattapoolwat 2001, Bounthong et al., 2004). This paper is an attempt to bring these ideas together in a 
rather wider consideration of the links between farming, rural development, employment diversification, 
patterns of poverty, and development interventions. 
 
ii
 See, for example: Moerman 1968 and Rigg, 1995 on Thailand; Eder 1999 on the Philippines; and  
Blaikie et al. (1980, 2001, 2002) on Nepal. 
 
iii
 His study was based on an initial period of work in 1959-1960, with a follow-up visit in 1965. 
 
iv
 Eder began his work in San Jose in 1970-72. Since then he has visited San Jose on six further 
occasions, in 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994-5 (see Eder 1993 and 1999). 
 
v
 Between 1966 and 1997 eleven surveys were conducted in East Laguna Village. 
 
vi
 The authors continue to depict East Laguna Village and the surrounding area as rural. 
 
vii
 These provinces being Ayutthaya, Ang Thong, Pathum Thani, Singburi, Suphanburi and Nakhon 
Pathom. 
 
viii
 The number of households in the „agriculture only‟ category is the same for core and off-spring 
households (n=25). As a proportion of the total number of households in each group, however, the 
figures are rather different: 26% for off-spring households and 40% for core households. 
 
ix
 This difference may be partly due to methodological differences in the measurement of farm and non-
farm income but much more important is likely to be that most of the studies quoting the 40% figure are 
based on research undertaken in the 1980s or early 1990s (Bryceson 2002: 730). 
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x
 In 1975, in a farming population of close to 8 million, fewer than 2 million Japanese farmers were aged 
over 65 years. In 2000 the farming population has shrunk to under 4 million and those aged more than 
65 had risen to more than 2 million (Economist 2005). 
 
xi
 A topic of popular debate and concern is the difficulty male Japanese farmers have in finding a spouse 
when young women (particularly) are disinclined to marry a farmer. Mail order brides have been one 
way around the impasse. 
 
xii
 North Subang has been extensively studied: by Hayami and Kikuchi (1981) in the 1970s; by White 
and Wiradi (1989) in 1981; by Breman in 1990 (Breman 1995); by Pincus (1995) in 1990-91; and by 
Breman again in 1998-1999. 
 
xiii
 The best example of this in academia is the notion of the „moral‟ economy of the peasant (Scott 
1976). 
 
xiv
 This is a point that Breman and Wiradi make in the context of Java (2002: 257) as do Rigg and 
Sakunee Nattapoolwat (2001) for Northern Thailand. 
 
xv
 See, for example, Blaikie et al. (1980, 2002) on Nepal; Cederroth and Gerdin (1986) and Cederroth 
(1995) on Indonesia; Molle and Thippawal Srijantr (1999) and Molle et al. (2002) on Thailand; and 
Hayami and Kikuchi (2000) on the Philippines. 
 
xvi
 Ironically, this was accentuated by the land reform programme which may have helped to equalise 
land ownership among landowners but, by undermining the land rental market, made it impossible for 
the landless to rent land and, therefore, widened inequalities (in terms of land use) within the community 
as a whole.  
 
xvii
 Breman sharply criticises an earlier study of the same village by Hayami and Kikuchi (1981) for 
perpetuating the „myth‟ of the autonomous village as closed and inward-looking and failing to appreciate 
the degree to which the village economy was implicated in wider networks of production and exchange. 
 
xviii
 Griffin et al. do write, in the appendix to their long paper: “…it should be recognised that land is not 
an equally important determinant of rural incomes in all agrarian societies. Non-farm rural activities are 
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much more significant in some countries than in others and where this is the case, the distribution of the 
ownership of land is relatively less important in determining the distribution of rural incomes” (2002: 
324). A key argument of this paper is that non-farm rural activities are becoming increasingly important 
components of rural incomes and livelihoods in many countries and should no longer be regarded as the 
exception to the rule.  
 
xix
 “The realization is gradually gaining ground that to satisfy aspirations of upward mobility outside the 
village [of North Subang in Java] and outside agriculture requires more and different knowledge and 
training than can be acquired purely through experience” (Breman and Wiradi 2002: 143). 
